EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy Droit et Politique de l'Immigration et de l'Asile de l'UE

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Par Corinne Delon-Desmoulin, Maître de conférences en droit public HDR-CE, Université Rennes 2.

Le Parlement européen a finalement décidé le 21 octobre 2021 (2020/2167(DEC)) d’accorder la décharge sur les comptes 2019 de l’agence Frontex après avoir ajourné celle-ci le 28 avril 2021. Sur base de la recommandation de la commission du contrôle budgétaire et de l’avis rendu par la commission des libertés civiles, de la justice et des affaires intérieures, l’assemblée plénière avait décidé de reporter sa décision de décharge du budget 2019 de Frontex par 528 voix contre 127 et 43 abstentions. Toutefois, la décharge accordée s’apparente davantage à un sursis accordé à Frontex qu’à un réel quitus.

Conformément aux articles 105 à 107 du règlement financier-cadre 2019/715 des organismes visés à l’article 70 du règlement financier général 2018/1046 et à l’article 76, §11 du règlement instituant l’Agence, chaque année, avant le 15 mai de l’année n+2, le Parlement doit donner « décharge » au directeur exécutif de celle-ci sur l’exécution du budget de l’année n. Sur recommandation du Conseil, il se prononce sur base du rapport de sa commission du contrôle budgétaire établi à partir de l’examen des comptes et des états financiers de l’Agence, du rapport annuel de la Cour des comptes sur les agences et des éventuels rapports spéciaux ainsi que de la déclaration d’assurance et de fiabilité des comptes fournie par la Cour. 

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By Jessica Schultz, Senior researcher at Chr. Michelsen Institute, Kari Anne Drangsland, Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Bergen, Marry-Anne Karlsen, Researcher at the University of Bergen,  Julia Kienast, Postdoctoral Researcher at Aarhus University, Nikolas Feith Tan, Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for Human Rights and Jens Vedsted-Hansen, Professor at Aarhus University.

Researchers in the TemPro project: Temporary Protection as a Durable Solution? The ‘Return Turn’ in Asylum Policies in Europe

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has raised urgent questions concerning how European countries should respond to people fleeing the war. While the initial response seems to be one of open borders and expressions of solidarity, calls to provide collective, temporary protection have been buzzing from Brussels to Oslo. The Council of the European Union unanimously decided on March 4 to activate, for the first time, the 2001 Temporary Protection Directive (TPD). In Norway, meanwhile, the government has decided to apply a long-dormant provision in the Immigration Act, §34 on ‘collective protection’. In Denmark, the government is preparing special legislation based on the TPD.

Who is fleeing the war in Ukraine? 

At the time of writing, over 2 million people have fled the Russian invasion. With Ukrainian adult males subject to the military draft, the first groups of refugees have mostly been women, children, the elderly and foreign nationals. Among the foreign nationals in the immediate outflow are non-Ukrainians from a diverse array of countries, including Moroccans, Chinese, Indians, Latin Americans amongst others, some of whom had been attending Ukrainian universities. At the start of the war, at least 5,000 refugees from countries such as Afghanistan and Syria were also living in Ukraine. There have been worrying reports of racist treatment of Black, South Asian and Mediterranean refugees at the border with Poland. 

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By Daniel Thym, Professor of European and International Law and Director of the Research Centre Immigration & Asylum Law, University of Konstanz, Germany.

Unusual times are said to call for unusual measures. The war of aggression against Ukraine, and the departure of literally millions of citizens within a few days have triggered an unprecedented wave of solidarity. UNHCR estimates that up to four million Ukrainians may seek refuge in neighbouring countries in the coming months. More than 150 thousand people are crossing the external borders each day. Member States are experiencing what Turkey and Lebanon witnessed in the early phases of the Syrian civil war: neighbouring states are the first countries of refuge.

Activating the Temporary Protection Directive 2001/55/EC was a smart and pragmatic response of the EU institutions. Member States unanimously agreed to do so at the meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on Thursday, 3 March 2022. The final text of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 was published the following day.

The Many Advantages of Temporary Protection

Recourse to this old Directive, which had not been activated a single time beforehand, has two main advantages. Firstly, it prevents an overstretch of scarce administrative resources. Beneficiaries will receive a protection status without the need to go through long and complex asylum procedures. Doing so would have taken weeks, if not months. State authorities can concentrate on the reception of beneficiaries instead.

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By Dr Meltem İneli Ciğer, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Suleyman Demirel University.

Russian armed forces launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine intensified as the days went by and the number of displaced persons grew rapidly. The Council of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs’ meeting on 27 February concluded that “The Commission proposed activating the mechanism provided for by the 2001 directive on temporary protection. There were expressions of broad support for this measure, which will be submitted to the JHA Council without delay.” The Council adopted a decision unanimously establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine and activated the Temporary Protection Directive 2001/55/EC (TPD) on 4 March 2022. This was the first time the TPD was activated since its adoption in 2001 and one may wonder why.

A personal Account of the Temporary Protection Directive and its non-implementation

I started working on temporary protection in 2011 when I began my Ph.D. at the University of Bristol. Over the years, I have questioned why the Temporary Protection Directive has not been implemented to respond to mass displacements from Tunisia and Libya following the Arab Spring and when nearly one million asylum seekers and migrants arrived in the Greek shores mostly Syrians fleeing the civil war in 2015. I had the opportunity to work alongside many great experts when the Study on the Temporary Protection Directive upon the initiative of the European Commission was being prepared and get to learn first-hand what the Commission, the Parliament, UNHCR, asylum NGOs, and academics thought of the Directive. So when I published my monograph, which was a revised version of my Ph.D. thesis, ‘Temporary Protection in Law and Practice’ in 2018, I was confident that there were six reasons behind the non-implementation of the Directive: Continue reading »

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By Caroline Leclercq, Project and Research Assistant for the Odysseus Academic Network for Legal Studies in Asylum and Immigration in Europe, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Institute for European Studies, Belgium.

Les multiples crises auxquelles l’UE a dû faire face au cours des dernières années ont poussé les États membres à rétablir des contrôles à leurs frontières intérieures afin de faire face à la menace terroriste, migratoire ou plus récemment sanitaire. Certaines dispositions du Code Frontières Schengen (CFS) autorisent de telles exceptions, mais pour une durée limitée. En cas de menace grave et prévisible (art. 25 § 1 CFS) ou imprévisible (art. 28 CFS) pour l’ordre public ou la sécurité intérieure, les États membres peuvent réintroduire le contrôle à leurs frontières pour une durée maximale de six mois. En outre, lorsqu’ils sont confrontés à des “circonstances exceptionnelles mettant en péril le fonctionnement global de l’espace Schengen en raison de manquements graves et persistants liés au contrôle aux frontières extérieures”, la durée maximale est portée à deux ans (art. 29 CFS).

Or, l’Allemagne, la France, l’Autriche et la Suède ont introduit des contrôles dépassant ces limites de temps. L’un de ces contrôles prolongés fait l’objet d’une question préjudicielle posée à la Cour de Justice dans une affaire NW/Landespolizeidirektion Steiermark qui concerne la contestation par un ressortissant slovaque d’une amende qu’il s’est vu infliger lors de son passage de la frontière entre la Slovénie et l’Autriche parce qu’il n’était pas en possession d’un document de voyage valide. Bien qu’il s’agit d’un cas précis, l’affaire recouvre plus largement la question de savoir si les limites de temps pour la réintroduction du contrôle aux frontières intérieures mentionnées dans le CFS sont absolues.  

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By Daniel Thym, Professor of European and International Law and Director of the Research Centre Immigration & Asylum Law, University of Konstanz, Germany.

Germany is an important player in EU migration law and policy. More than 6 million third country nationals are living in the country, which receives the highest overall number of asylum applications in Europe. This blogpost presents the projects on migration in the coalition agreement of the new government of Social Democrats, Greens, and Liberals, dubbed Ampelkoalition (‘traffic light coalition’, after the colours commonly used for the participating parties). We shall see that it foresees noticeable innovations and surprise outcomes, both for the domestic and the European debate. Germany swims against the tide of restrictive policies.

Double Nationality and Swift Naturalisation

In a symbolic move, the coalition agreement speaks of a ‘modern country of immigration’, thus bringing to an end the decade-long debate as to whether Germany should be labelled as a ‘country of immigration’ (Einwanderungsland). To be sure, the distinction had lost its former fascination in recent years. Few people would seriously doubt that a country with a foreign-born population of 16.1% qualifies as a ‘country of immigration’. Yet the move is symbolically relevant, not least since it is supported by another decisive move to facilitate naturalisation. 

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